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The euro’s impact on the money market
At the start of the Third Stage of EMU, it was by no means clear whether the ECB
would succeed in setting up an efficient framework for distributing liquidity
throughout the euro-zone. Now in retrospect, however, the ECB appears to have
been quite successful. In this paper, we will look at the major impact of the ECB's
operational framework on the daily business of the euro area money market. We
will also examine whether the ECB has in fact succeeded in creating a uniform
monetary policy resulting in similar liquidity costs in all participating countries. And
we will elaborate on the development of the various segments of the money
market. In addition to trade volumes, we will focus on money market integration
and the extent to which EMU has affected market efficiency compared with that of
the predecessor markets. Finally, we will present a number of conclusions and
identify factors that continue to hamper the optimal functioning of the market.
Impact of the ECB’s operational framework on the money market
By definition, the start of the Third Stage of EMU had a significant impact on the
money market's daily business. The shift in responsibility for monetary policy from
the national central banks to the ECB had a clear impact given the banks' crucial
role in the money market regarding the distribution of liquidity and determining the
level of short-term interest rates. Let us elaborate further on the major changes
brought about by the Eurosystems’ operational framework1.
Distribution of liquidity
The ECB has offered liquidity to credit institutions in the euro area based on
general refinancing needs, with no bias towards any particular country. As a result,
the liquidity allotted often does not exactly match the needs of a particular
counterparty or a particular country. This means that liquidity must be redistributed
in the secondary market. In the past 18 months, banks have effectively formed a
two-tier structure in which larger institutions with a euro-wide presence handle the
cross-border flow of liquidity and smaller institutions play a more restricted national
role. This system mainly emerged as a result of historical bank relationships and
credit risk considerations. At the time of the introduction of the euro, banks in each
individual country had been doing business with each other for many years while
the large banks in different countries were already frequently involved in mutual
cross-border transactions. However, banks were generally not aware of the
creditworthiness of the smaller banks in other countries. From this point of view,
the emergence of a two-tier market is no surprise. But it is clear that this situation
puts the largest banks at an advantage. While performing an important function in
distributing liquidity, they are able to profit from arbitrage opportunities on days
when liquidity imbalances cause (small) interest rate differentials between the
EMU participant countries.
Participants in the main refinancing operations
A considerable downward trend has emerged in the number of bidders
participating in the ECB main refinancing operations compared with the second
half of 1998 when credit institutions still had to deal with their national central bank.
                                                
1 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the ECB’s targets and its operational
framework in detail. However, we have provided a brief description of these issues in
Appendix 1, which may be useful in better understanding money market developments
discussed later in this paper.
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This has also increased the need to redistribute liquidity among the euro area
market participants. It must be noted, however, that there is still a large number of
participants in the main refinancing operations compared with the US. There are
several potential explanations for the downward trend.
• Centralisation of cash management
• New infrastructure requirements discourage small and medium-sized banks to
participate
• Mergers and acquisitions in the financial services industry: the number of
monetary financial institutions in the euro-zone dropped by 5% between
December 1998 and January 2000
• Uncertainty about amount of funds allotted to each participant in the euro
system’s fixed rate tender
Bidding behaviour
In the first 18 months of stage three of EMU, the ECB used weekly fixed rate
tenders in its main refinancing operation2. This type of auction was vulnerable to
overbidding. The demand for ECB funds by European banks structurally exceeded
the amount of money the ECB was willing to allocate. The banking sector was
abusing the fixed rate tender and the ECB was unable to stop this practice, which
clearly did not work in favour of the ECB’s reputation. The reason behind the
overbidding was that banks could make easy profits. Those with sufficient
collateral at their disposal sought to borrow cheaply from the ECB, as the refi rate
paid on ECB funds is usually lower than overnight rates on the interbank market.
Moreover, banks were aware that their competitors would also ask for more than
they needed, thereby encouraging further overbidding.
In order to solve the problem of overbidding, the ECB switched to a variable
interest rate tender and a minimum bid rate at the end of June. These tenders
allow banks to bid for both the amount and the rate. The advantage of an interest
rate tender is that banks can seek the level of funds they like, provided they have
sufficient collateral, but money will only be allocated to the highest bids. Under this
type of system, banks would normally have less incentive to ask for more than
they need, because higher demand will tend to drive up the refi rate. Indeed, as
can be seen in the graph, the allotment ratios shot up after the introduction of the
variable tender, indicating the ECB had succeeded in solving the problem of
overbidding. Nonetheless, by using the variable tender system the ECB has lost
full control over short-term interest rates and can only steer the direction of
monetary policy by changing the minimum bid rate. For example, if market
participants expect the ECB to hike rates in the near future, they will anticipate by
bidding higher interest rates in the weekly tenders, thereby driving up both the
marginal and weighted average refi rates (see graph).
Is there a single monetary policy in practice?
At the beginning of stage three, the ECB took over responsibility for monetary
policy from the national central banks. The question of whether the ECB is indeed
successful in conducting a single monetary policy can be answered by analysing
two criteria. First of all, the price of liquidity provided by the central bank and the
price of redistributing that liquidity on the secondary market should be identical.
Secondly, the procedures used to implement monetary policy should be equal
across the euro-zone area.
                                                
2 The difference between fixed and variable rate tenders is explained in Appendix 1.
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Pricing
The ECB conducted its main refinancing operations from January 1999 to June
2000 in the form of fixed-rate tenders. The price of central bank liquidity was
therefore by definition identical for all euro-zone banks during that period.
However, because the ECB switched to a variable rate tender at the end of June,
banks now obtain liquidity from the central bank at different prices. A publicly
available breakdown of the costs of liquidity in each euro-zone country is not
available so it is unclear whether this new tender procedure has resulted in a
single price for liquidity in each country. This also holds true for the long-term
refinancing operations, which are also in the format of a variable rate auction.
However, we have drawn some cautious conclusions based on information
released by the ECB on interest rates offered in the bidding procedure. In the first
weekly variable tender at the end of June, there was quite a large gap between the
highest interest rate bid and the marginal rate at which funds were supplied. But
the differential shrank considerably in subsequent tenders, indicating that the initial
gap was due to the fact that banks were unfamiliar with the new tender system.
Once they got their bearings, the gap narrowed. Consequently, it appears that the
cost differential for central bank liquidity across the euro-zone will be minimal.
Even if this does not prove to be the case, there may be unity of monetary policy. If
short-term interest rates were identical across the euro area, a uniform money
market yield curve would create a homogeneous base for the monetary policy
transmission process. Of course divergent credit ratings for banks in the various
regions will always cause minor differences in cross-border interbank interest
rates. In its May 1999 Monthly Bulletin, the ECB stated that data for the EONIA
calculations supplied by Euribor banks in different member states showed very low
dispersion. There is also little discrepancy in rates supplied by Euribor banks for
calculating reference Euribor rates. However, the latter evidence should be viewed
with caution given that it is based on declared rates instead of transaction rates.
Procedures
The second criterion in evaluating the effectiveness of the ECB’s single monetary
policy concerns its procedures for implementing monetary policy, which must be
identical in all member states in order to conduct a uniform monetary policy. The
most problematic issue in this respect concerns collateral in the weekly main
refinancing operation. In order to receive central bank credit, banks must maintain
a certain amount of collateral in case of defaults. The ECB and the national central
banks have published lists of assets that qualify as eligible collateral, which are
separated into tier 1 and tier 2 assets. This enables the ECB to pay attention to the
different financial structures in place across the EMU. Tier 1 assets are high-
quality marketable debt instruments, such as government bonds, fulfilling uniform
euro area wide eligibility criteria specified by the ECB. Tier 2 consists of additional
marketable and non-marketable assets, which are of particular importance to
national financial markets and banking systems, and are subject to eligibility
criteria established by the national central banks.
The latter category impedes uniformity as the list of tier 2 assets is different in
each member state and some national central banks have been much stricter in
setting up these lists than others3. In addition, countries with substantial levels of
domestic collateral or credit institution bonds were in a more comfortable position
                                                
3 For example, the Dutch banking sector did not obtain elegibility for a huge outstanding
amount of triple-A WSW loans (private mortgage loans).
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from the very start of EMU, while banks in certain less well-endowed countries
appeared to be more constrained in early 1999 when bidding for central bank
funds. The relative scarcity of securitised collateral is also partly due to differences
in the maturity level of financial markets in individual euro-zone countries. The
varying degrees of development in private security markets and legal frameworks
for securitisation are examples of this. The differences appear to be fading, partly
because more collateral has become available. In addition, substantial strides
have been made in the cross-border use of collateral, which appears to have
somewhat mitigated the problems associated with uneven distribution of collateral
across the euro-zone.
The development of different segments of the euro money market
In examining developments in the most important segments of the euro-zone
money market, we focused on three commonly distinguished markets: the market
for unsecured deposits where credit institutions exchange short-term liquidity
without the guarantee of collateral, the repo market in which market participants
exchange short-term liquidity against collateral, and the foreign currency swap
market4. In the following section, we will also look at the derivatives market and the
markets for short-term securities. In addition to particular developments in these
segments, we will pay attention to money market integration and efficiency, and
how EMU has affected these factors compared with the predecessor market.
Unsecured credit market
According to the ESCB market survey, the market for unsecured deposits
expanded by 16% between the last quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of
1999. However, certain maturities developed much more favourably than others.
Overall growth in the unsecured market can mainly be attributed to the shortest
maturities, particularly overnight transactions. In the longer maturities, turnover
declined markedly while trading volumes were relatively low. The increase in
turnover in the unsecured market as a whole was a direct result of the introduction
of the single currency. As the ECB distributes liquidity in an unbiased manner
based on general refinancing needs in the euro-zone, liquidity is redistributed on
the interbank market (unsecured deposits). The redistribution of funds is also
partly effected by cross-border transactions. As the unsecured market showed
strong growth, its share in total money market turnover rose from 48% to 53%.
The unsecured segment of the money market has shown a high degree of
integration. Triggered by the need to redistribute funds, liquidity circulates
efficiently within the euro area. The significant increase in cross-border activity
between euro area institutions after the fourth quarter of 1998 is a direct
consequence of this development. Other evidence for market integration is the
convergence of yields. On several occasions the ECB has pointed out that the
dispersion across countries of overnight rates is also quite low. The same goes for
the dispersion of the offered rates supplied by Euribor banks for the calculation of
the reference Euribor rates.
                                                
4 The figures were taken from ESCB market surveys. The data cover the last quarter of 1998
and the second quarter of 1999. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, there were no figures
available for more recent periods. As the figures were taken from surveys, the results are
only indicative of actual developments on the money market. All data include only
transactions between credit institutions. Repo market data in particular do not include
transactions with central banks.
Turnover of unsecured transactions
Daily transactions average in EUR million
Q2 99 Q4 98 % change
Maturity
Overnight 61,197 42,927 +42.6
Tom next 9,062 8,794 +3.0
1 week 11,118 14,561 -23.6
2 weeks 1,883 1,826 +3.1
1 month 1,986 2,408 -17.5
3 months 1,984 3,197 -37.9
6 months 704 1,553 -54.7
9 months 189 552 -65.8
1 year 403 450 -10.4
>1 year 79 32 +146.9
Total 88,605 76,300 +16.1
Source: ESCB market survey
Recourse to standing facilities
EUR billions, period averages of daily positions
Maintenance period
ending in:
Marginal lending facility Deposit facility
1999 Feb 3.8 1.3
Mar 0.4 1.4
Apr 0.7 0.3
May 0.8 0.4
Jun 0.4 0.6
Jul 0.4 0.5
Aug 0.5 1.0
Sep 0.2 0.7
Oct 0.3 0.6
Nov 0.3 0.4
Dec 0.3 1.0
2000 Jan 1.9 0.5
Feb 0.1 0.2
Mar 0.2 0.3
Apr 0.2 0.9
May 0.4 2.3
Jun 0.3 0.8
Jul 0.4 0.5
Average 0.6 0.8
Source: ECB
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Finally, recourse of banks to ECB standing facilities may provide an indication of
the degree of integration and efficiency in the unsecured deposits market.
Assuming perfect markets, recourse to these facilities should only take place at
the end of the reserve maintenance period with only one of the facilities used. This
would reflect an excess or shortage of liquidity due to ECB mistakes in estimating
general liquidity needs in the euro-zone. If we abandon this assumption, standing
facilities may either be used at other times during the maintenance period or the
marginal lending facility and deposit facility may be used simultaneously. This
would signal inefficiencies in the market in redistributing liquidity among banks.
Average use of standing facilities during the maintenance period was generally
low, and has fallen compared to the early stages of EMU5. Moreover, by the end of
the maintenance period, only one of the two facilities is usually significantly used.
This indicates an efficient and well-integrated market.
Repo market
In the period under review, turnover in the repo market increased by almost 24%.
Contrary to the market for unsecured deposits, growth was not concentrated only
in the shortest maturities. The relatively strong performance in the longer
segments, as compared with unsecured transactions, is a result of the greater
security provided by repo transactions. In addition to the introduction of the euro,
the necessity of limiting credit exposure and reducing capital needs also attributed
to favourable developments in the repo market. The share of repo transactions in
the money market jumped from 20% to 24%.
Integration in the repo market has hardly improved since the introduction of the
euro. Major factors commonly perceived to prevent full integration are difficulties in
cross-border-settlement of collateral, various forms of legal uncertainty, different
tax treatment of bonds, diverging prices of underlying bonds and their different
degrees of liquidity and an uneven availability of collateral in the euro-zone. Some
obstacles are technical and relatively easy to solve. Others relate to structural
differences in national tax and legal systems. Achieving greater harmonisation
across the euro-zone requires more far-reaching intervention, and hence a
significant commitment by national authorities.
The prevailing hierarchy for general collateral rates is among the factors pointing
to a low degree of integration. French and German securities were relatively
expensive, whereas Belgian, Spanish and Italian securities were relatively cheap.
Differences in the yields of the underlying bonds can mainly be attributed to
different degrees of liquidity and the impact of specials trading, which is largely
done in German and French bonds.
Swaps against foreign currencies
Contrary to the increasing trend in segments discussed above, turnover in foreign
currency swaps declined by about 24%. Activity decreased in nearly all maturities.
The most important reason for this development is the disappearance of cross-
currency trade among EMU participants. Nonetheless, turnover in currency swaps
still amounted to 23% of total market turnover (32% in the last quarter of 1998),
which is substantial and comparable in size to the repo markets. A substantial
share of currency swap transactions was cross-border.
                                                
5 At first glance, the average use of standing facilities may appear high. However, the
foregone daily interest of individual banks is small as the opportunity costs (either the
deposit or marginal lending rate minus overnight rates) amount to about 1% and the
number of credit institutions represented by these figures is roughly 1,000.
Turnover of repo transactions
Daily transactions average in EUR million
Q2 99 Q4 98 % change
Maturity
Overnight 10,727 8,123 +32.1
Tom next 11,916 9,289 +28.3
1 week 8,983 7,378 +21.8
2 weeks 2,665 3,045 -12.5
1 month 2,773 2,248 +23.4
3 months 1,776 1,244 +42.8
6 months 333 433 -23.1
9 months 109 148 -26.4
1 year 344 136 +152.9
>1 year 20 5 +300.0
Total 39,646 32,049 +23.7
Source: ESCB market survey
Turnover currency swaps
Daily transactions average in EUR million
Q2 99 Q4 98 % change
Maturity
Overnight 9,718 9,654 +0.7
Tom next 15,383 18,944 -18.8
1 week 2,689 3,486 -22.9
2 weeks 2,316 2,301 +0.7
1 month 3,800 7,651 -50.3
3 months 3,010 5,079 -40.7
6 months 1,160 2,156 -46.2
9 months 568 1,350 -57.9
1 year 490 606 -19.1
>1 year 185 243 -23.9
Total 39,319 51,470 -23.6
Source: ESCB market survey
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Money market derivatives and securities
Short-term derivatives market
According to the ESCB market survey, average daily interest rate swap
transactions increased by 72% from Q4 1998 to Q2 1999. As the table illustrates,
the strongest increases were in the longest and shortest maturities. The bulk of the
transactions were cross-border.
Since the start of stage three of EMU, the integration, standardisation and depth of
the short-term derivatives market have increased significantly. Its depth and
liquidity increased notably as the market became totally unified. This is confirmed
by the existence of a single swap yield curve for the whole euro-zone. Evidence for
increased liquidity was reflected, for example, in the development of bid-ask
spreads. Spreads narrowed compared to those prevailing in the markets before
stage three of EMU and now amount to 1-2 basis points. In addition, the standard
deal size increased to an average of EUR 50mn, and large individual deals (EUR
5bn) were not uncommon. The main reasons for the success of the euro swap
market are the following:
• Swaps are used instead of government paper for hedging positions in fixed
income instruments such as corporate paper.
• Arbitrage is widely performed on swaps
• High liquidity and debt has attracted more participants
• Increased interest for off-balance-sheet instruments
As for other derivatives, the euro futures market increased significantly in the
period under review. For example, open positions on three-month euro futures
contracts increased by 16%. This development came at the expense of over-the-
counter transactions, except swaps. The euribor three-month futures market
quickly became very deep and liquid as was partly reflected by tight bid-ask
spreads. The Euribor became a single reference in the cash market, at the
expense of the Euro Libor. The success of the euro money markets’ futures
contracts is due both to the standardisation of the euro wholesale markets and the
harmonisation of the euro cash markets, with the Euribor as the main reference.
Short-term securities
The primary market for short-term securities (mainly Treasury Bills, CDs and CPs)
gradually expanded in 1999. One of the most striking trends is the divergent
pattern in issuing activity between private and public issuers. While supply of fresh
short-term government paper was modest and declined in the course of the year,
privately issued paper showed strong growth. The supply of CDs and CPs showed
a particular increase. The public sector issuance was negatively influenced by the
improvement of the fiscal positions of the euro area national governments, on the
back of favourable cyclical developments, and the shift in public debt from short to
long maturities in order to benefit from historically low long-term interest rates. In
the private sector, stronger economic activity (increased spending in investment in
fixed assets) and the trend towards financial desintermediation have fostered an
increased issuance of private short-term securities. As a result of these different
issuance patterns, the amount of outstanding Treasury Bills declined, while
outstanding CDs and CPs showed a robust increase. In fact, privately issued
securities overtook the short-term government paper market.
Activity in the markets for short-term securities
EUR billion
Amount outstanding
Q2 99 Q4 98 % change
Treasury bills 306.1 312.9 -2.2
CD 210.5 188.5 +11.7
CP 85.7 66.2 +29.5
Gross new issuance
Q2 99 Q4 98 % change
Treasury bills 281.2 301.5 -6.7
CD 518.1 340.1 +52.3
CP 292.3 242.8 +20.4
Total turnover
Q2 99 Q4 98 % change
Treasury bills 468.9 492.0 -4.7
CD 90.7 99.1 -8.5
CP 103.6 48.4 +114.0
Source: ESCB market survey
Activity in the interest rate swap market
Average daily transactions (notional amount in EUR millions)
Q2 99 Q4 98 % change
Maturity
1 week 4,636 2,153 +115.3
2 weeks 4,397 1,952 +125.3
1 month 7,957 4,276 +86.1
3 months 7,906 4,588 +72.3
6 months 4,263 3,104 +37.3
9 months 1,858 763 +143.5
1 year 2,461 1,144 +115.1
> 1 year 7,002 5,602 +25.0
Total 40,480 23,582 +71.7
Source: ESCB market survey
Three-month money market bid-ask spreads
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000*
Euro area average 14.4 12.4 9.6 8.9 8.4
stand dev 3.0 3.5 1.8 3.1 3.1
Germany average 16.5 15.1 8.2 9.2 8.5
stand dev 6.3 7.6 2.9 4.1 3.1
France average 4.6 2.7 3.0 2.8 3.1
stand dev 4.6 2.7 3.0 2.8 3.1
Italy average 11.3 9.3 10.1 8.9 8.5
stand dev 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.6 3.1
US average 12.5 11.3 8.8 9.0 9.3
stand dev 2.9 5.3 4.0 2.9 2.8
Japan average 12.0 9.8 11.5 10.5 10.4
stand dev 2.0 3.8 3.6 5.9 1.1
* Up to mid-April
Source: Standard & Poors's DRI
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Integration in the short-term security market was generally slower than that of the
market for unsecured deposits and remained relatively fragmented and
domestically oriented. There are a number of explanations for this. Firstly, at the
beginning of stage three of EMU, markets for short-term securities were
underdeveloped or non-existent in some euro-zone countries. Secondly, there is
less incentive for portfolio diversification as financial intermediaries do not hold
short-term securities for investment purposes but rather as a substitute for cash.
Money market funds are focused on the national market, so the number of cross-
border transactions is small. Thirdly, there are considerable problems related to
infrastructure, such as the lack of adequate settlement procedures for cross-
border transactions, insufficient harmonisation of the settlement procedures used
for domestic transactions and of the relevant legal frameworks.
Conclusions
On the whole, the ECB has done a good job on liquidity management in the euro
area. It has set up an efficiently working framework to distribute liquidity. In
addition, the ECB is in practice succeeding in efforts to conduct a single monetary
policy. This is reflected in the equal costs of liquidity throughout the euro-zone.
Initially, there were a number of difficulties concerning collateral issues and the
type of tender used in refinancing operations, but these problems appear to have
been solved.
Stage three of EMU has created a single money market and improved liquidity and
efficiency. But the degree of integration varies significantly across the different
market segments. On the one hand, the unsecured market has quickly become
deep and highly integrated. On the other hand, the repo market and the market for
short-term securities remain fragmented and domestically oriented. Some factors
hampering further integration and efficiency are technical, and hence relatively
easy to overcome. However, others, such as differences in tax and legal systems
are more deeply rooted. Progress in this area will depend on the actions of
national authorities.
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The euro’s impact on capital markets
The launch of the euro has created the world’s second largest market for bonds
and has given a strong impulse to equity markets. Nonetheless, it would be unfair
to attribute these developments solely to the introduction of the new currency.
Other forces have also contributed, including the globalisation of financial markets,
tighter BIS regulations, the spread of advanced technologies, deregulation and the
Single Market Programme. But in many cases, the euro has functioned as a
catalyst for change. In this article, we will characterise the nature of changes in the
capital markets in the third phase of EMU and discuss their efficiency and
integration, along with the impediments to further integration.
Characterising euro-zone capital markets
Although the US dollar market remained the largest bond market in 1999, net
issuance of euro-denominated bonds took off in the first quarter, overtaking US
dollar bonds by the third quarter. For the year as a whole, Euro-denominated
issuance also exceeded that in US dollars and the entire market for euro-
denominated bonds grew by 33%, against 28% for dollar-denominated bonds. In
the same period, market capitalisation in equities markets increased by more than
50%, to EUR 5,512bn, owing to an increased appetite for equities and more
company listings. These trends mean financing in the euro-zone has become more
capital-market oriented, although the financing of corporates is still predominantly
bank-oriented. The euro-zone economies’ reliance on bank financing is more than
100% of GDP, compared with less than 50% of GDP in the US. The ratio of the
total outstanding domestic stock of bonds and equity capital to bank loans is 1.7 in
Europe, against 7.1 in the US.
It is difficult to breakdown the bond market into issuer types due to differences in
both (sampling) methods and definitions. Taking stock of all euro-denominated
international bonds and auctioned domestic issues, total government plus
agencies and supra-nationals clearly account for the largest slice of the pie (55%
in 2000 H1). Asset-backed securities follow (19%), due to the success of German
banks in securitising mortgage loans (Pfandbriefe). Financial institutions and
banks rank third (18%). Where sovereign and ‘financials’ bond markets were
already well-developed in the pre-euro era, corporate bond markets were in a
fledgling stage. Currently, corporates account for 10% of gross issuance in the
total euro-denominated bond market.
Sovereign bond market
During the second stage of the EMU, economic convergence went hand in hand
with convergence of sovereign bond market yields. The convergence of the market
is reflected in the dramatic fall in spreads of all maturities over German bunds,
which was beneficial to both sovereign issuers and portfolio managers. The graph
shows that the 10-year euro-benchmark spread over German bunds fell to about 9
basis points in the first half of 2000. In the same vein, the volatility in yields of 10-
year government paper in the euro zone has declined substantially. Gross
issuance of government bonds amounted to EUR 625bn in 1999 and EUR346bn in
the first half of 2000, down 6.6% on the first half of 1999. The fall in gross issuance
is mainly related to the reduced size of fiscal deficits and is a direct effect of EMU.
Gross issuance is expected to fall further in the second half of this year owing to
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substantial receipts from the UMTS auctions across Europe, which will largely be
used to repay debt.
Reduced spreads and lower volatility are clear signs of a more efficiently operating
sovereign bond market. However, given the narrow spreads between various
sovereign issues, transaction costs may impede portfolio investors from further
diversifying their sovereign bond portfolios. Instead, investors have adopted the
strategy of a passive reallocation, through reinvesting coupons, redemptions and
new cash flows. In addition, the absence of currency risk has encouraged
investors to focus on such items as liquidity, security design and issuance policy.
The shift in focus among portfolio managers has evoked some important changes
in the sovereign bonds market, which have boosted its efficiency. First, the
minimum issue size has increased to EUR 5 bn, and this has become a
requirement for inclusion in the Euro-MTS electronic system. The benchmark
issues tend to be around EUR 10-15bn, double the size of former German issues.
Sovereign issuers have also initiated policies that aim to standardise issues and
increase their liquidity. Currently, German paper is the benchmark for bonds with a
maturity up to two years and over ten years, while the mid-segment of the yield
curve is obtained by French Treasury bonds. The liquidity of German sovereign
bonds is reinforced by a well-developed bund futures market and, to a lesser
extent, by French treasuries. Other governments have launched programmes to
re-denominate their paper in accordance with benchmark issues to boost liquidity.
Alternatively, governments are trying to carve out a niche market with innovative
instruments, such as inflation-linked bonds. Governments are increasingly making
use of primary dealers and pre-announced issue calendars to improve market
transparency and reach a more diverse investor base.
Further convergence of the sovereign market is unlikely unless governments
give up their control over fiscal policy. However, at this juncture the time is not yet
ripe yet for such a far-reaching measure. Relatively high transaction costs and
differences in tax treatments have slowed the pace of geographical redistribution
of sovereign bonds across the euro zone. Nonetheless, elevated transaction costs
may be reduced by the increasing use of electronic trading systems.
Private sector bond market
The introduction of the euro has been a catalyst for corporate restructuring via
mergers and acquisitions, mainly in the non-banking sector. The transaction value
of M&A business soared from EUR 446bn in 1998 to EUR 1187bn in 1999.
Corporates have increasingly relied on the capital market to finance their M&A
plans, with Telecom companies among the most active issuers of debt. Also,
tighter BIS regulations and an increased focus on shareholder value have
encouraged banks to arrange and lead-manage issues and, where possible,
securitise loans. The German banks’ sales of mortgages-loans (Pfandbriefe)
account for a large share of the private market and the French, Spanish and
Luxembourg governments have launched similar initiatives.
Although the private sector euro-denominated bond market represents only one
fifth of the equivalent US market (EUR 750bn and EUR 3.500bn respectively), the
launch of the euro has triggered a spectacular rise in the gross issuance of private
sector bonds. The market for corporate bonds nearly tripled in 1999, while gross
issuance by banks (31%), other financials (52%) and utilities (68%) also showed
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strong growth. The number of issues rose from 2,686 in 1998 to 3,260 in 1999
while the average issue size also increased from EUR 200mn in 1998 to EUR
400mn in 1999.In the first seven months of this year, total issuance of bonds by
financials and corporates fell 8.6% year-on-year. This difference can be traced to
the June 1999 jumbo telecom issue, but given the results of the UMTS auctions
we are expecting a flurry of issues later this year.
By the beginning of 1999, most investors replaced their national benchmarks with
European indices. The breadth of the market has also increased, as more
companies started issuing bonds. This is reflected in the fall of the average credit
rating of private issues from AA+ in 1998, to AA in Q12000, bringing average
credit ratings more in line with those in the US. In addition, fierce competition
among lead-managers has prompted a decline in gross fees to below common US
standards.
Low yields on government bonds and reduced government financing needs have
encouraged institutional investors to consider riskier credits. And because
government paper is relatively less available, other jumbo issues, such as
Pfandbriefe, have obtained a place in benchmark portfolios. So far, fear has kept
fund managers from buying sub-investment grade paper on a massive scale. This
is due both to the fact that institutional investors are not allowed to hold sub-
investment grade paper and to the relative dearth of knowledge about managing
sub-investment grade credit risk, particularly in a volatile market.
The integration of capital markets in Europe is far from complete and there are
important impediments towards further integration. The cross-border trading of
bonds is frustrated by the lack of a pan-European settlement system. But even if
this system were in place, trading is hampered by legal and institutional
differences. First of all, there is no uniformity in bankruptcy laws, which may scare
investors away from unfamiliar markets. The same could also be said about
differences in accounting practices and corporate governance that can create
confusion among investors. In addition, divergent tax regulations usually give
domestic securities an advantage over foreign securities, which discourages the
cross-ownership of assets.
Equity market
Equity markets have strongly benefited from the third phase of EMU. Market
capitalisation in euro-zone equity markets grew by no less than 52% to EUR
5,512bn between end 1998 and end 1999. The growth in equity markets is not due
only to the outperformance of equity returns compared with bonds, but also to new
share issuances and initial public offerings (IPOs). This has resulted in a
spectacular rise in market capitalisation. In particular, new technology companies,
which have less access to bond markets, made increasing use of equity capital.
This is made clear by the relative success of the EURO.NM market, a pan-
European group of regulated exchanges aiming to attract high-growth company
listings.
Investors’ calls for more efficient transaction and settlement systems have stepped
up mergers among equity bourses across Europe. The exchanges in Amsterdam,
Paris and Brussels have merged into Euronext. At the same time, the London
Stock Exchange (LSE), the Frankfurter Börse and the Swedish OM Group are in a
tough battle to form a new exchange. Such moves are the first steps towards a
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global trading system for equities since talks were launched between the European
bourses and their US and Asian counterparts.
The integration of equity markets has been thwarted by the fact that portfolio
managers in larger countries could not always invest in equities in the smaller
countries due to a lack of liquidity. Because investors in smaller countries had
more opportunities to diversify their portfolios, equity indices in the larger euro-
zone countries outperformed those in the smaller countries. In addition, the fact
that the main equity market indices have outperformed midcap indices is partly
due to pension funds’ strategies to buy both liquid stocks and track the main
benchmarks6. Furthermore, the same institutional and legal arguments apply as for
private sector bonds.
The bottom line
The consolidation of the national capital markets into a single European capital
market has yielded economies of scale. On the supply side, the euro has
stimulated a growing number of issuers and, on average, larger volumes of issues,
which have appealed to a larger investor base. In addition, fierce competition
among issuers in the sovereign market has led to harmonisation of new issues and
re-denomination of existing issues. In the private sector bond market, competition
between issue co-ordinators has lead to an impressive fall in average fees and a
decline in average credit ratings. The euro has boosted the equity markets and
attracted a number of newcomers, mainly from high-growth IT-sector companies.
On the demand side, the elimination of the exchange rate risk has helped relax
currency matching rule requirements imposed on many institutional investors for
assets and liabilities. This has prompted a shift in the bias of national portfolio
allocation in favour of assets from larger euro-zone members, and, to some extent,
countries from outside the euro zone. Low yields on sovereign bonds and lower
issuance volumes created by the Growth and Stability Pact have forced investors
to consider investing in both lower-rated credits and equities to boost their portfolio
performance. Demand for equities has been further reinforced by strong growth in
the European pension market, high savings rates, and changing preferences
among retail investors.
The obstacles to further integration of capital markets are both technical and
institutional. Technical impediments, including differences in trading and
settlement systems, will gradually disappear through the emergence of new trading
and settlement systems, or further consolidation among the most important
exchanges. Institutional differences, such as bankruptcy laws, financial
accounting, corporate governance and tax treatment, will prove to be more difficult
to overcome. These issues are bundled in the European Commission’s Financial
Services Action Plan, which is due to be finalised by 2005.
                                                
6 It can be maintained that larger companies outperformed the midcaps, but since P/E for
larger companies are much higher than for midcaps, this argument can also be
downplayed.
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Appendix 1
ECB monetary policy: strategy and objectives
The ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability, which is defined as an
annual increase in consumer price inflation of less than 2%. To achieve this goal,
the ECB is pursuing a two-pillar strategy. The first pillar assigns a prominent role to
money, reflecting the fundamentally monetary origins of inflation over the medium
to longer term. The reference value for money supply growth is currently 4½%.
This value has been derived so as to be consistent with, and serve the
maintenance of, price stability in a manner that sustained and/or prolonged
deviations of the increase of the monetary aggregate from the reference value that
normally signals risks to price stability. While inflation is a monetary phenomenon
over the medium term, for shorter periods it will be influenced by other variables.
The second pillar is therefore associated with a more eclectic view of the world.
This pillar consists of a broadly based assessment taking on board both the
outlook regarding price developments and the risks to price stability in the region
as a whole. In this case the inflation forecast, which is also used as an
intermediate target, serves as the main reference point. A wide range of indicators
are used to assess the inflation outlook such as the output gap, wage growth,
exchange rates, asset prices and surveys of inflation expectations.
The monetary operational framework of the ECB
An important element of the ECB’s operational framework is the minimum reserve
requirement. Under this system the central bank requires credit institutions to hold,
on average over a one month period, a share of their liabilities at a reserve
account with their national central bank. The amount of the reserve is significant,
in the order of EUR 100-110 billion. This creates a structural liquidity shortage and
forces credit institutions to borrow funds (back) from the central bank to meet their
liquidity needs. By setting limits on the amount of funds it lends to the banks, or by
changing the official rates at which the credit institutions can borrow money, the
central bank is able to steer money market rates. The ECB pays interest over the
balances equal to the average refi rate during the period the reserves are held.
This ensures that euro-based institutions do not suffer a competitive disadvantage
compared with UK-based banks (the Bank of England does not impose a reserve
ratio). The reserves provide a buffer against unexpected liquidity shocks,
mitigating related fluctuations in market rates. However, the stabilising effect of the
averaging provision becomes weaker and eventually vanishes towards the end of
the reserve maintenance period, when banks are no longer in a position to defer
fulfilment of their reserve requirements.
The ECB has at its disposal a number of instruments to manage the liquidity
situation and to refinance the credit institutions, the most important of which are
the main refinancing operations7. A refinancing transaction involves the national
central banks (NCBs) or the ECB buying or selling eligible assets under
                                                
7 In addition to the weekly tenders, there is a monthly tender set with a three-month term to
provide the banking system with longer-term liquidity. The ECB only uses this instrument
for a limited potion of the refinancing volume and does not intend to use it to signal
monetary policy intentions to the market. The ECB therefore conducts the monthly auctions
as variable rate tenders with pre-announced intended allotment volumes. Further potential
open market instruments are outright transactions, the issuance of debt certificates, foreign
exchange swaps and the collection of fixed-term deposits. These instruments can be used
for fine-tuning and structural operations.
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repurchase agreements or conducting credit operations using eligible assets as
collateral. On Tuesday mornings, there is a weekly refi tender for money market
funds with a two-week term. The bids are taken by the NCBs, centralised at the
ECB, and allocated for the entire euro-zone money market (with no bias towards
any country). The rate at which banks can borrow these funds (the refi rate) is
fixed if the central bank specifies the interest rate in advance and participating
banks bid for the amount of money they want to transact at the fixed rate.
Alternatively, the rate may be ‘variable’, in the sense that banks bid both the
amount of money they want to transact with the central bank and the interest rate
at which they want to enter into the transaction.
Standing facilities aim at providing and absorbing overnight liquidity, thereby
imposing limits on overnight market interest rates and signalling the general stance
of monetary policy. The marginal lending facility allows banks to obtain overnight
liquidity from the NCBs at a pre-specified rate (above the repo rate) against eligible
assets. This facility is intended to satisfy banks’ temporary liquidity needs. This
rate provides a ceiling for short-term rates. The deposit facility will allow banks to
make overnight deposits with the NCBs at a pre-specified rate below the repo rate.
Under normal circumstances, this rate will provide a floor for short-term rates. The
band between these two rates has so far amounted to 200 basis points.
Barcelona, 18-19 September 200014
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